Working Papers

Breaking the Bubble - The Determinants and Effects of Cross-partisan Contact (2026)

with Vlasta Rasocha

Abstract: Should policymakers intervene to reduce social segregation? The answer depends on the impact of contact among those who avoid it, and whether observed segregation reflects individuals’ preferences or mistaken beliefs. We conduct a field experiment in the context of political segregation in Brazil to measure the joint distribution of preferences and beliefs about interactions with opposing partisans, and the treatment effects of actual contact. We find evidence of a segregation trap: the most hostile partisans avoid contact because they incorrectly predict that it will be unpleasant and unproductive. We randomize partisans into interactions using strong financial incentives and find that a single interaction reduces both the prediction error and discrimination. These effects are driven by partisans who are avoidant and hostile at baseline, persist over five months, and raise their demand for future interactions. Our findings suggest that current policy interventions promoting outgroup interactions without incentives fail to reach the highest-impact target groups. Finally, we test an alternative policy that corrects beliefs without direct exposure, and find that it raises demand for interactions with opposing partisans at substantially lower cost. 

Media: Carta Capital, Estadão, Folha de S. Paulo, Gazeta do Povo, Jota, Terra, Veja

Funders: National Science Foundation, Weiss Fund, J-PAL Governance Initiative, J-PAL Crime and Violence Initiative, J-PAL Jobs and Opportunity Initiative, Stanford King Center, CEGA Berkeley, Institute for Humane Studies, Stanford SIEPR, Stanford IRiSS, Stanford GRO, Stanford CLAS, Stanford PACS

Implementation partners: My Country Talks, Instituto Sivis, RenovaBR, More in Common

Video campaign: Desktop, Mobile

Does Contact Reduce Affective Polarization? Field Evidence from Germany (2023)

with Martin Koenen

Abstract: We analyze whether and how exposure to political opponents can impact attitudes toward political opponents (affective polarization) and extremity of political opinions (ideological polarization). We present findings from a quasi-experiment in Germany that matched 15,000 participants for a virtual one-on-one conversation with a stranger. Leveraging staggered treatment assignment, we find significant reductions in affective polarization among treated participants in both incentivized economic interactions and survey outcomes. In contrast, we do not find corresponding effects on ideological polarization, suggesting that exposure increases tolerance but not support for opposing positions.

Media:Allianz, Bild, DW, Psychology Today, Reuters Institute, ZEIT Online (1), (2), (3)

Work in Progress

Know Your Place - Employment Decisions among Couples 

with Shakil Ayan, Nina Buchmann, Pascaline Dupas, and Muriel Niederle

Piloting Complete; Funded by the IGC

Abstract: Men globally out-earn women, which may reflect not only market frictions but also intra-household social norms. We develop a lab-in-the-field experiment to test how two such norms—the Male Breadwinner Norm (MBN), that men should earn more than their wives, and the Female Homemaker Norm (FHN), which we formally define as the belief that women should contribute more to household chores—affect couples’ labor market decisions in Bangladesh. In the experiment, husbands and wives make incentivized choices between paired job bundles varying in income, occupational prestige, and required household chores. These choices reveal each spouse’s willingness to pay (WTP) to comply with or violate each norm. Our pilot results suggest that both men and women forgo earnings to maintain the male-breadwinner and female-homemaker structure, and that prestige differences, not income alone, drive male-breadwinner compliance.

Hidden Identities, Stereotypes, and Discrimination

with Vlasta Rasocha

Piloting; Funded by J-PAL JOI, Stanford King Center, Stanford SIEPR, Stanford Europe Center, Stanford DDRO

Abstract: Negative stereotypes and discrimination in economic markets often motivate members of minorities to assimilate, concealing markers of their minority status when interacting with the majority group. Motivated by a theory of strategic assimilation, we propose that high-ability minority members are more likely to invest in assimilation compared to low-ability minority members. If employers neglect selection into assimilation, this not only entrenches labor market discrimination, but also reinforces negative stereotypes about the ability of the minority group. We test these predictions in a field experiment in the context of discrimination against the Roma in the Czech Republic, conducted in partnership with a local NGO and a major national employer. To study selection into assimilation, we invite Roma jobseekers with diverse educational backgrounds and job experience to submit applications and measure how jobseekers of different ability levels conceal ethnic markers in résumés and recorded answers to interview questions. To measure the impact of selective assimilation on stereotypes and discrimination, we recruit employers to evaluate applications filled out by Roma and majority jobseekers, randomly revealing jobseekers’ minority status in a treatment group.

Contact on the Job

with Vlasta Rasocha and Pedro C. Sant’Anna

Piloting; Funded by the Weiss Fund, J-PAL JOI Brazil, Stanford King Center, Berkeley CEGA

Abstract: How should managers address political and racial conflict in the workplace? We address this question by combining a field experiment embedded into a job training program and a survey experiment with firm managers in Brazil. We establish the causal effect of political and racial conflict on productivity and turnover by randomizing job training participants into either homogeneous or diverse teams. We then evaluate the impact of a cross-randomized deliberation intervention that is currently implemented in a multinational company. In the manager experiment, we survey firms’ policies to navigate political and racial conflict, and elicit incentivized beliefs about the impact of the deliberation intervention. We then randomize an information treatment that provides information on the productivity impact of the intervention. We measure the effect of correcting managers’ beliefs on their demand for the intervention.

The Effects of Salary Range Reporting Requirements

with Mariana Guido and Carl Meyer

Piloting; Funded by J-PAL North America Social Policy Research Initiative, Stanford SIEPR

Task Allocation and Labor Market Decisions among Couples 

with Mariana Guido, Sahana Subramanyam, and Jason Weitze

Piloting; Funded by the Weiss Fund, Stanford King Center, Stanford SIEPR