Working Papers

Breaking the Bubble - The Determinants and Effects of Cross-partisan Contact (Job Market Paper)

with Vlasta Rasocha

Abstract: Should policymakers intervene to reduce social segregation? The answer depends on the effect of increased contact among those who would not seek it out on their own. We conduct a field experiment in the context of political segregation in Brazil to measure the joint distribution of aversion to cross-partisan interactions and the treatment effects of actual interactions on outgroup hostility. To do so, we randomize participants into interactions offering incentives of twice the daily minimum wage for compliance. We find evidence of a segregation trap: the most hostile partisans avoid interactions because they incorrectly believe they will be unpleasant and unproductive. Actual interactions correct these beliefs and lead to large, long-lasting reductions in hostility. Importantly, these effects are largest among partisans with high levels of baseline hostility and aversion to outgroup interactions, and lead to an increase in demand for future interactions. In a cost-benefit analysis, we find that current policy interventions targeting volunteer participants are outperformed by incentive-based interventions at any level of budget. Finally, we show that a lower-cost intervention that substitutes a video for actual interactions can produce similarly beneficial effects.

Media: Carta Capital, Estadão, Folha de S. Paulo, Gazeta do Povo, Jota, Terra, Veja

Funders: National Science Foundation, Weiss Fund, J-PAL Governance Initiative, J-PAL Crime and Violence Initiative, J-PAL Jobs and Opportunity Initiative, Stanford King Center, CEGA Berkeley, Institute for Humane Studies, Stanford SIEPR, Stanford IRiSS, Stanford GRO, Stanford CLAS, Stanford PACS

Implementation partners: My Country Talks, Instituto Sivis, RenovaBR, More in Common

Video campaign: Desktop, Mobile

Does Contact Reduce Affective Polarization? Field Evidence from Germany (2023)

with Martin Koenen

Abstract: We analyze whether and how exposure to political opponents can impact attitudes toward political opponents (affective polarization) and extremity of political opinions (ideological polarization). We present findings from a quasi-experiment in Germany that matched 15,000 participants for a virtual one-on-one conversation with a stranger. Leveraging staggered treatment assignment, we find significant reductions in affective polarization among treated participants in both incentivized economic interactions and survey outcomes. In contrast, we do not find corresponding effects on ideological polarization, suggesting that exposure increases tolerance but not support for opposing positions.

Media: Allianz, Bild, DW, Psychology Today, Reuters Institute, ZEIT Online (1), (2), (3)

Work in Progress

Contact on the Job

with Vlasta Rasocha and Pedro C. Sant’Anna

Piloting; Funded by the Weiss Fund, J-PAL JOI Brazil, Stanford King Center, Berkeley CEGA

Abstract: How should managers address political and racial conflict in the workplace? We address this question by combining a field experiment embedded into a job training program and a survey experiment with firm managers in Brazil. We establish the causal effect of political and racial conflict on productivity and turnover by randomizing job training participants into either homogeneous or diverse teams. We then evaluate the impact of a cross-randomized deliberation intervention that is currently implemented in a multinational company. In the manager experiment, we survey firms’ policies to navigate political and racial conflict, and elicit incentivized beliefs about the impact of the deliberation intervention. We then randomize an information treatment that provides information on the productivity impact of the intervention. We measure the effect of correcting managers’ beliefs on their demand for the intervention.

Know Your Place - Employment Decisions among Couples 

with Shakil Ayan, Nina Buchmann, Pascaline Dupas, and Muriel Niederle

Piloting Complete; Funded by the IGC

Abstract: Men globally out-earn women, which may reflect not only market frictions but also intra-household social norms. We develop a lab-in-the-field experiment to test how two such norms—the Male Breadwinner Norm (MBN), that men should earn more than their wives, and the Female Homemaker Norm (FHN), which we formally define as the belief that women should contribute more to household chores—affect couples’ labor market decisions in Bangladesh. In the experiment, husbands and wives make incentivized choices between paired job bundles varying in income, occupational prestige, and required household chores. These choices reveal each spouse’s willingness to pay (WTP) to comply with or violate each norm. Our pilot results suggest that both men and women forgo earnings to maintain the male-breadwinner and female-homemaker structure, and that prestige differences, not income alone, drive male-breadwinner compliance.

Hidden Identities, Stereotypes, and Discrimination

with Vlasta Rasocha

Piloting; Funded by J-PAL JOI, Stanford King Center, Stanford SIEPR, Stanford Europe Center, Stanford DDRO

Abstract: Negative stereotypes and discrimination in economic markets often motivate members of minorities to assimilate, concealing markers of their minority status when interacting with the majority group. Motivated by a theory of strategic assimilation, we propose that high-ability minority members are more likely to invest in assimilation compared to low-ability minority members. If employers neglect selection into assimilation, this not only entrenches labor market discrimination, but also reinforces negative stereotypes about the ability of the minority group. We test these predictions in a field experiment in the context of discrimination against the Roma in the Czech Republic, conducted in partnership with a local NGO and a major national employer. To study selection into assimilation, we invite Roma jobseekers with diverse educational backgrounds and job experience to submit applications and measure how jobseekers of different ability levels conceal ethnic markers in résumés and recorded answers to interview questions. To measure the impact of selective assimilation on stereotypes and discrimination, we recruit employers to evaluate applications filled out by Roma and majority jobseekers, randomly revealing jobseekers’ minority status in a treatment group.

The Effects of Salary Range Reporting Requirements

with Mariana Guido and Carl Meyer

Piloting; Funded by J-PAL North America Social Policy Research Initiative, Stanford SIEPR

Abstract: Recently implemented policies in the US have mandated employers to provide pay ranges in job applications. We test whether the policies achieve their stated goal of reducing gender and racial gaps in labor market outcomes. To do so, we conduct experiments with job applicants and employers to study the supply and demand reaction to the introduction of salary ranges. In the experiment with applicants, we study how applicants' beliefs, application decisions, and requested wages react to the introduction and manipulation of salary ranges on job ads. Through this variation, we are able to separately measure the impact of the policy on (i) sorting introduced through application decisions and (ii) bargaining behavior, conditional on applications. Through a survey experiment with hiring managers, we provide evidence on firms' strategies when constructing salary ranges. Finally, we test whether hiring managers correctly anticipate applicant responses and the implications for the overall impact of the policy.

Task Allocation and Labor Market Decisions among Couples 

with Mariana Guido, Sahana Subramanyam, and Jason Weitze

Piloting; Funded by the Weiss Fund, Stanford King Center, Stanford SIEPR

Abstract: The birth of a child triggers a sharp increase in household chores, disproportionately burdening women and reinforcing the motherhood penalty in labor force participation. In this paper, we assess the role of intra-household dynamics as a factor explaining why existing policies aiming to support working mothers have had limited success in closing this gap. We conduct an experiment with couples in Brazil, eliciting beliefs and preferences and bargaining decisions over labor and household responsibilities pre- and post-childbirth. In the experiment, we test the effect of an information intervention as well as a bargaining tool offered by a start-up on chore allocations and labor market outcomes.